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THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY:  
FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
Laurel A. Rigertas* 
There is a point at which an institution attempting to provide protection to 
a public that seems clearly, over a long period, not to want it, and perhaps 
not to need it—there is a point when that institution must wonder whether 
it is providing protection or imposing its will.  It must wonder whether it 
is helping or hurting the public.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of the legal profession is failing in its consumer protection 
role because the manner in which the quality of legal services is currently 
regulated causes insurmountable problems with access to legal services.  
Current regulations restrict activities that constitute the practice of law to 
licensed attorneys.  This restriction is justified, in large part, based on the 
assumption that the public cannot make informed decisions about who is 
qualified to provide legal advice and, therefore, the government must make 
that determination.2  Even if this assumption is correct, restricting the 
practice of law to those who have completed a juris doctor has constrained 
the market options so that many consumers have no access to legal services 
at all.3  This also has consumer protection implications. 
The practical effect is that a large number of consumers—who are 
presumed incapable of assessing the quality of legal services when making 
purchasing decisions—are for all practical purposes presumed capable of 
becoming educated and informed enough about the law to handle their legal 
matters pro se.4  These two presumptions are irreconcilable.  The first 
presumption justifies limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys if we, 
 
*  Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., University of 
Minnesota Law School.  I would like to thank the participants of this Colloquium, The Legal 
Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014), for their 
feedback and comments.  I would also like to thank Laurel Terry and Marc Falkoff for their 
comments on earlier drafts.  Lastly, I would like to thank my research assistants Zachary 
Clark and Alex Van Maren. 
 1. In re Op. No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 
1360–61 (N.J. 1995). 
 2. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
 4. This Article uses the word “consumers” instead of “clients” because many 
individuals seek the services of a lawyer but are never able to obtain them due to cost 
constraints, so they never become “clients.”  The word “client” presupposes an attorney-
client relationship. 
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as a society, are financially committed to providing everyone with access to 
a licensed attorney.  We are not.5  Therefore, the regulators of legal services 
need to address the pragmatic problem raised by the second presumption.  
Many people who cannot afford a licensed attorney need some help, and 
many of them could probably pay something reasonable for it, but those 
options are not available. 
Making lawyers’ services more affordable and accessible has been a 
declared goal of the legal profession for decades.6  The profession’s 
attempts to meet this goal have included efforts to increase funding for legal 
aid, campaigns to increase pro bono work, and revisions to rules to allow 
the unbundling of legal services.7  Recently, the profession has also been 
examining the rising cost of legal education and student debt as they relate 
to the cost of legal services.8  Despite these efforts, however, study after 
study has shown an increase in unmet legal needs.9 
Most innovations in the delivery of legal services are occurring in the 
marketplace by companies trying to reach a segment of consumers that the 
legal profession has not been able to serve successfully at an affordable 
cost.10  There is now a long history of companies trying to fill this void 
starting with Nolo Press in the 1960s and evolving into the technologically 
savvy LegalZoom.11  Such innovations are largely happening in spite of the 
regulations on the practice of law.  Those regulations are still steeped in 
rules that restrict the exploration of many innovations.12 
Regulations—particularly those that prohibit some consumer options—
should balance the management of consumer risks with the impact on 
innovation and access.  Both have consumer protection implications.  The 
current balance has tipped too far in the direction of managing risks to the 
point of stifling innovation.  It is time for the main regulators of the legal 
profession—the state supreme courts—to revisit the scope of the legal 
profession’s exclusive monopoly.  As a practical matter, this means 
 
 5. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:  THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf. 
 6. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 209, 215 (1990). 
 7. Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS:  THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND 
CIVIL JUSTICE 11 (1996) (recommending an expansion of unbundled legal services to 
increase access to legal services). 
 8. See, e.g., Judith Welch Wegner, Response:  More Complicated Than We Think, 59 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 623, 639–40 (2010). 
 9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 13–18. 
 10. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. 
Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 4 (2012); see also John S. Dzienkowski, The 
Future of Big Law:  Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2995, 3000–01 (2014) (discussing innovations in the delivery of services to 
corporate clients). 
 11. Jon M. Garon, Legal Education in Disruption:  The Headwinds and Tailwinds of 
Technology, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1174–77 (2013) (describing the historical background 
and rise of self-help legal services such as Nolo Press, LegalZoom, and FindLaw). 
 12. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 
1281, 1286 (2013). 
2014] FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 2685 
assessing deregulation of some legal services as well as assessing 
alternative ways to deliver regulated services.  Because of unmet demand, 
much of this is happening irrespective of the rules governing the practice of 
law.13  But if the state supreme courts want to remain relevant to the 
regulation of the practice of law, they need to take more of a leadership role 
in these areas. 
I.  WHAT JUSTIFIES GOVERNMENT REGULATION? 
When the government decides to regulate in any area, two questions 
should be addressed:  why does the government need to regulate this area 
and how should the government regulate this area?  This Part briefly 
explores some theories of when regulation is appropriate, particularly when 
the chosen regulatory method is to ban certain options from the 
marketplace.  This Part then examines several reasons to regulate the legal 
profession and ban nonlawyers from providing legal services. 
A.  Consumer Protection and the Public Interest—Generally 
Government regulations can have a variety of justifications,14 but a key 
justification for the legal profession’s monopoly is to protect consumers.15  
This is not the only justification, but it is one of the more frequently cited 
ones.16  Thus, it is worth taking a moment to ask what “consumer 
protection” usually means.  One definition states, “The consumer protection 
laws are intended to ensure that consumers can select effectively from 
among those options with their critical faculties unimpaired by such 
violations as deception or the withholding of material information.”17  
 
 13. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What 
Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067 (2014) (discussing changes that are taking place in the 
market for legal services despite few changes to the regulations on the practice of law). 
 14. Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2688–92 (2012) (surveying different regulatory theories). 
 15. Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 
(1979) (“Occupational restrictions, in the form of state licensing laws and so-called ‘ethical’ 
restraints imposed by professional associations, have traditionally been justified on the 
assumption that they protect consumers.”). 
 16. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 113 S.W.3d 105, 121 (Ky. 
2003) (“The rationale for [unauthorized practice of law] restrictions is that ‘limiting the 
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services 
by unqualified persons.’” (quoting  KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(5.5) cmt. 2)); Dressel v. 
Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Mich. 2003) (“At the core of this movement and of all 
other attempts to regulate the practice was an interest in protecting the public from the 
danger of unskilled persons practicing law.”); Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law v. O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 213 (Mont. 2006) (“[T]he primary 
reason for prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law is to protect the public from being 
advised and represented by unqualified persons not subject to professional regulation.”).  For 
a more expansive list of possible regulatory objectives, see Terry et al., supra note 14, at 
2734 (proposing a list of regulatory objectives for the legal profession). 
 17. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice:  The Practical Reason for 
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44, 44–45 (1998). 
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Stated another way, “effective consumer choice requires two things:  
options in the marketplace and the ability to select freely among them.”18 
The law has long supported the idea that consumers generally have the 
ability to purchase all sorts of products and services that may or may not 
suit their needs and may or may not deliver the desired results.19  Just think 
of all the advertisements claiming that exercise DVDs will produce six-
pack abs in just weeks, creams will make wrinkles fade, vitamin 
supplements will make joint pain disappear, drinks will make energy soar, 
insurance you need will be at the price you name, Botox will make eyes 
more youthful, acupuncture will increase fertility, and so on.  In the end, 
maybe they will, maybe they will not.  But in our free market—in the 
absence of conduct such as fraud—consumers can usually make these 
purchasing decisions and then live with the consequences.  In the private 
ordering of affairs, parties can also allocate risks, and individuals may 
implicitly or expressly assume the risk of adverse outcomes, even when the 
adverse outcome is as catastrophic as paralysis or death.20  Such allocations 
are generally enforced unless they violate public policy.21 
Consumer protection laws focus predominately on making sure that 
consumers have accurate and complete information about products and 
services so that they can make informed decisions when deciding what to 
buy or whom to hire.22  Such laws and regulations include those that 
prohibit false or misleading advertising23 and those that require additional 
information, such as disclaimers, warnings, or adequate instructions.24  
Licenses and certifications can also provide consumers with additional 
information when they make purchasing decisions.25  Consumers can be 
protected by preventative measures, such as requiring certain labeling on 
drugs at the time of marketing,26 as well as remedial measures, such as 
 
 18. Id. at 46. 
 19. Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 685–86 (W. Va. 2005) 
(describing the principle of freedom to contract and its public policy limits). 
 20. See, e.g., Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1062–63 (2d Cir. 1992) (remanding for a 
new trial because the jury was not instructed to consider whether the decedent expressly 
assumed the risk of nonconventional cancer treatment that failed to cure her cancer); Crace 
v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 909–12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the doctrine 
of primary assumption of risk barred a paralyzed cheerleader’s claim against the university). 
 21. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446–47 (Cal. 1963) 
(holding on public policy grounds that a release of a hospital’s liability for negligence was 
not valid). 
 22. See Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 306–07 (Mass. 1980) 
(“The overall purpose of [the consumer protection law] is that of ‘providing proper 
disclosure of information and a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to 
persons conducting business activities.’” (quoting Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen., 385 
N.E.2d 240, 249 (Mass. 1979))). 
 23. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.41 
(West 2006). 
 24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572q (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 94.676 
(West 2012). 
 25. See Reich, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
 26. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 12-505 (LexisNexis 2009). 
2014] FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 2687 
consumer protection statutes that provide a private right of action when a 
consumer is injured.27 
While consumer protection laws usually strive to help consumers have 
access to good information or to provide remedies when they are harmed, 
there are some laws and regulations that remove consumer choices from the 
market.  When the government steps in to determine the options available to 
consumers, “it replaces the decisions of consumers in the marketplace with 
government edicts, a method whose premise is fundamentally incompatible 
with the liberal assumption that each person is the best judge of his or her 
own needs.”28  Thus, there should be strong justifications for prohibiting 
consumer options. 
Because the legal profession’s monopoly prohibits almost all consumer 
options for legal advice and representation other than licensed attorneys,29 it 
is useful to examine theories that justify a total ban of some consumer 
options, as opposed to warnings, disclaimers, or other informational 
requirements.30  One theory is that bans “are thought to be necessary 
whenever the risk and magnitude of physical or economic harm thereby 
avoided is deemed substantially greater than . . . benefits foregone.”31  But 
what justifies the government’s risk-benefit analysis to determine on behalf 
of consumers what options should be removed from the marketplace?  
When do we let consumers determine their own level of risk aversion or 
risk taking and when should the government make those determinations? 
One possible answer to this question is that a ban is justified when there 
are significant costs to the public that arise in the absence of a ban.32  The 
ban of leaded gasoline would be one example.33  No one can buy leaded gas 
today for use in on-road vehicles.34  The use of leaded gasoline put 
thousands of tons of lead into the air that caused lead poisoning, particularly 
in children.35  Another way to think about bans in this category is that they 
require collective action to advance both individual and societal interests; 
i.e., no individual could chose to remove lead from the air they breathe 
 
 27. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a (West 2008). 
 28. Reich, supra note 15, at 14. 
 29. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. See infra note 86. 
 30. See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 45–46. 
 31. Reich, supra note 15, at 11–12.  “The likelihood of consumer harm . . . may be so 
great relative to the benefits that . . . a total ban is justified.” Id. at 32. 
 32. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
570, 577–84 (1996) (discussing the need for regulation in the face of externalities causing 
environmental harm); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, REGULATION, 
Winter 2006–2007, at 34–40, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/
files/regulation/2006/12/v29n4-4.pdf. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006) (regulating forms of air pollutants including lead 
compounds). 
 34. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Takes Final Step in Phaseout of Leaded 
Gasoline (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-takes-final-step-
phaseout-leaded-gasoline. 
 35. Id. 
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without collective action.36  Government edicts that mandate collective 
action are the only way to accomplish these goals.  There are some who 
argue that this is the only category where the government should be 
regulating.37 
Another possible justification for regulations that ban options is to 
protect individual consumers from harm.  This has been called a 
“purchasing agent model” where the government is acting paternalistically 
on behalf of consumers because “consumers cannot be trusted to make 
rational purchases . . . [so the government needs] to protect consumers from 
the consequences of their own appetites.”38  A less paternalistic view is that 
consumers will misestimate physical or economic risks for a variety of 
reasons.39  For example, the Food and Drug Administration is in a better 
position than is the average consumer to assess the safety and efficacy of 
drugs before they are sold to individuals.  It is not that the government does 
not trust consumers to make good decisions if all drugs were unregulated; 
but instead it is not pragmatically feasible that consumers could understand 
the risks and benefits enough to make an informed purchasing decision. 
It is difficult, however, to come up with an example of a prohibition that 
operates solely to protect individuals and does not have any broader societal 
impact.40  In reality, most bans probably serve a hybrid purpose; whether 
they are justified depends on how one views their primary purpose.  Laws 
that prohibit the sale of cars without seatbelts, laws that ban trans fats, and 
legal attempts to restrict the size of sodas are all examples that fall 
somewhere along the spectrum of this hybrid category.41  On the one hand, 
decisions about what risks are acceptable to one’s body and finances are 
personal decisions and there is a robust political debate about whether 
 
 36. See Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny?  Choice, Paternalism and Public 
Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SUPPLEMENT) 88, 88 
(2013) (quoting Dr. Thomas Farley, Health Commissioner for New York City, who stated:  
“The reason we have government in the first place is to solve problems collectively that we 
can’t solve individually”). 
 37. See Lambert, supra note 32, at 34–40; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 
(David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859) (“The only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”). 
 38. Reich, supra note 15, at 19–20.  When the government decides who can offer certain 
services, it has effectively taken on the role of purchasing agent, “assessing the merits and 
demerits of particular products on behalf of consumers.” Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. at 20.  “The point is that it is the ignorance of consumers, rather than the 
product’s intrinsic risk, which triggers the inquiry into the need for government action.” Id. 
at 25. 
 40. Many would disagree with this point.  Some would say that bans on items such as 
trans fats are paternalistic decrees that deprive individuals of choice.  While there is room to 
debate about when government should intervene, to say that health problems caused by poor 
diet have no broader societal costs is simply not correct. See infra notes 44–45 and 
accompanying text. But see Lambert, supra note 32, at 34–40. 
 41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114377 (West 2012) (banning the use of trans fats 
in food preparation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-136.3 (2013) (prohibiting food containing 
trans fats from being made available to students by public schools); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-
76.2 (West 2012) (prohibiting the sale of automobiles not equipped with seat belts). 
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government regulation is appropriate in these areas.42  On the other hand, 
injuries from accidents and health problems related to poor diet can have 
significant indirect public costs in the form of increased healthcare 
expenditures and impacts on the labor market.43  Unlike the example of 
leaded gas, where the risk of breathing polluted air cannot be averted 
without collective action, an individual can choose whether to risk the 
injuries that could result from not wearing a seatbelt regardless of the laws 
in place.  An individual cannot, however, choose what the medical costs 
will be as a result of those injuries or the impact on the ability to be in the 
workforce, so to argue that the consequences of such a personal decision 
has no societal impact, albeit indirect, is mistaken.44  The debate about the 
appropriateness of the law, therefore, frequently revolves around an 
assessment of whether the regulations have a sufficient nexus to the public 
interest.45 
B.  Historical Justifications for the Legal Profession’s Monopoly 
There are several possible objectives for regulating the legal profession,46 
but regulating the delivery of legal services does not necessarily mean that 
only lawyers can deliver legal services.  Different types of practitioners 
could be regulated too.47  This section, therefore, focuses on the 
justifications that are most commonly cited as the basis for limiting the 
practice of law to lawyers.  First, the legal profession’s monopoly 
theoretically protects individuals from the personal consequences of 
incompetent legal advice that could include losses to life, liberty, and 
property.48  The monopoly also serves a broader public interest in the 
integrity of the rule of law and the effective functioning of the judicial 
branch of government.49 Our adversarial system of dispute resolution is 
usually more effective with trained practitioners, which is why, for 
example, there is a right to counsel in criminal cases.  In this sense, the 
 
 42. See, e.g., In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 97–100 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing individual liberty over personal decisions against the state’s interest in 
preserving life). 
 43. See, e.g., Merav W. Efrat & Rafael Efrat, Tax Policy and the Obesity Epidemic, 25 
J.L. & HEALTH 233, 239–44 (2012). 
 44. But see Wiley et al., supra note 36, at 89 (suggesting that increased healthcare costs 
are as much a function of our collective financing of healthcare as it is a function of 
increased obesity). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 90 (detailing the debate about the “nanny state” versus “personal 
responsibility” in the context of legal attempts to restrict the size of soft drinks). 
 46. Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734 (proposing a list of regulatory objectives for the 
legal profession). 
 47. See John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi?  The Repercussions for the 
Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 537–38 
(describing the liberalized delivery of legal services under the United Kingdom’s 2007 Legal 
Services Act). 
 48. I say “theoretically” because this assumes that everyone has access to a lawyer and a 
substantial portion of the population does not have access. 
 49. See, e.g., Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734 (proposing a list of regulatory 
objectives for the legal profession). 
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regulation of the legal profession is unique when compared to the regulation 
of other professions—no other profession is integral to a branch of 
government.50  The monopoly protects the financial interests of lawyers by 
limiting competition.  This section briefly examines each of the theoretical 
justifications for the legal profession’s monopoly. 
1.  Protecting Consumers 
One key justification for the legal profession’s monopoly is to protect 
consumers from the adverse consequences to their personal and financial 
interests that could result from bad legal advice.51  Simply protecting 
consumers from such losses, however, is not necessarily a sufficient 
justification.  The law routinely allows consumers to assume the risk of all 
sorts of physical and economic losses, many of which are catastrophic.52  
Why can a consumer assume the risk of great physical injury by going on a 
challenging private ski course, but not assume the risk of hiring an 
unlicensed paralegal to draft a divorce petition?  The difference is the 
assumption that a consumer can become sufficiently educated to make an 
informed choice about the former, but not about the latter.  This is not 
purely paternalistic in the sense that government does not trust consumers, 
but instead comes from a belief that consumers cannot be given enough 
information to adequately assess the quality of professional services and 
make an informed assessment of risk.53  Only other professionals can assess 
whether their peers are qualified to provide the services.54  By requiring 
education, an exam, and licensing, the regulatory system ensures some 
minimum level of qualifications for those authorized to practice law.55 
In other words, the monopoly exists primarily to correct what has been 
called “internal market failures,” which are defined as limitations inside the 
mind of the consumer that impede the consumer’s ability to make a 
reasoned selection among a variety of options.56  The state regulatory 
system, by insuring a minimal level of competency through licensing, 
 
 50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013). 
 51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 52. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:  How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2000).  Economists refer to 
goods as “credence goods,” when it is an expert who determines the buyer’s needs. Id. at 
968–69.  This same rationale applies to other regulated professions, such as physicians. See 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:  Regulation, Management, 
or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 827 (1995) (stating that physician licensing is justified 
because consumers cannot assess the quality of physicians so they must rely on licenses 
issued by competent authorities). 
 54. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 53, at 983 (“In all these [U.S.] jurisdictions, the bar 
examination is set and graded by the bar.”). 
 55. Whether the standards are sufficient to protect consumers may be open to debate.  
Many legal employers have lamented that law school graduates are not “practice ready,” and 
that they require substantial on-the-job training to become proficient enough to provide 
competent legal representation. See, e.g., id. at 985 (“A law degree, by itself, leaves a lawyer 
poorly equipped to do very much in the real world of client representation.”). 
 56. Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 49. 
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operates to protect the consumer from the consequences of making bad 
choices in the market.57 
Whether consumers are truly incapable of making assessments about the 
quality of professional services in all situations is worth reexamining.  The 
internet has provided consumers with increasing access to information 
about the law and to information about the quality of services provided.58  
Furthermore, an increasing number of consumers have been making the 
choice to use services, such as LegalZoom, to meet some of their legal 
needs instead of hiring a lawyer.  There is little evidence of significant 
consumer harm arising from these choices.59 
2.  Advancing the Integrity of the Judicial System and the Rule of Law 
A key rationale for the legal profession’s monopoly is not only to protect 
individuals, but also to advance a broader societal goal of maintaining the 
public’s confidence in the rule of law and the judicial branch of 
government.60  Having unqualified legal practitioners in the courts, for 
example, could have a deleterious impact on the functioning of the judicial 
system.  In the late 1800s, an early advocate for the institution of uniform 
statewide bar examinations argued:  “Unfit and unworthy men have been 
admitted.  The time of the courts has been uselessly consumed.  Progress 
has been impeded.  Litigation has increased and justice has been delayed.”61  
Another lawyer in the 1920s stated the following regarding the need to curb 
the unauthorized practice of law: 
The layman, a natural person or corporate, may only compete with the 
lawyer in the practice of the law and the doing of law business by orally 
soliciting or advertising to do it more expeditiously, faithfully, 
intelligently, and at less expense than the lawyer, thereby imputing to the 
lawyer slothfulness, infidelity, and extortion.  A loss of confidence in the 
courts and lawyers is a sign of governmental decline, and a forerunner of 
disintegration and anarchy.62 
 
 57. See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising:  Balancing Risk, Hope, and 
Social Welfare, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 549 (2010) (“Most . . . traditional regulatory attempts 
to change behavior aim to ‘insulate’ people from making injurious choices by restricting the 
choices available for them to make.”). 
 58. See Knake, supra note 12, at 1291–96. 
 59. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the 
Public?  Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2605–
06 (2014). 
 60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013) (“The legal profession 
is largely self-governing.  Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-
government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship 
between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement.”). 
 61. HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY:  THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 85 (1974). 
 62. SPECIAL COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF BAR ASS’N DELEGATES, ON WHAT 
CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF THE LAW AND WHAT CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL AND IMPROPER 
PRACTICE OF THE LAW BY LAYMEN OR LAY AGENCIES (1919), reprinted in 44 N.Y. STATE 
BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING HELD AT NEW YORK, 
JANUARY 21–22, 1921 AND CHARTER, CONSTITUTION, BY-LAWS, LISTS OF MEMBERS, 
OFFICERS, COMMITTEES AND REPORTS FOR 1920 app. A at 302–03 (1921) (emphasis added). 
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Having competently trained legal practitioners in the courts, therefore, is 
important to a society whose identity is based largely on the rule of law and 
the integrity of its judicial system.63 
This rationale is certainly a noble one, but it is undercut by a couple of 
realities on the ground.  First, the public’s perception of the rule of law and 
equal justice is harmed when much of the public lacks meaningful access to 
legal representation in the courts.64  The public tends to view lawyers as 
hired guns for the wealthy as opposed to affordable advocates for the 
average citizen.65  This perception is harmful to the integrity of the courts 
and the judicial branch. 
Second, lawyers perform different types of work in many different 
settings:  advocacy work in the trial and appellate courts, advocacy work in 
other types of tribunals such as arbitrations and administrative proceedings, 
transactional work, and consulting on regulatory compliance, to name some 
examples.  Not all of these settings implicate the integrity of the judicial 
branch to the same degree, so the strength of this justification is not 
necessarily the same across the spectrum of legal services. 
3.  Economic Protectionism 
Another possible rationale for the monopoly that needs to be addressed is 
economic protectionism.  Under this rationale, the state has effectively 
given lawyers a franchise and, therefore, lawyers have a property interest in 
their law licenses.66  Prohibiting competition from unlicensed practitioners 
protects that property interest in part by keeping lawyers’ fees high.67  This 
rationale is not commonly articulated in support of maintaining the 
monopoly because self-protectionism is not a particularly noble endeavor 
and does not curry favor with the public, but it is an ever-present 
 
 63. See supra note 60. 
 64. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 26 (“To the extent that litigants are 
proceeding without counsel because they cannot afford an attorney, and the outcome of their 
case is being compromised by lack of representation, equal justice is at risk.”).  The disparity 
of resources between prosecutors and public defenders also does little to advance the 
public’s sense of fairness and equality in the justice system. See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, 
The Presumption of Guilt:  Systemic Factors That Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 271 (2009). 
 65. See Russell Pearce, The Legal Profession As a Blue State:  Reflections on Public 
Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1358–62 (2006) 
(discussing the shift to the hired gun paradigm); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of 
Law:  The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 185 
(2004) (discussing the public’s perception that the average citizens view tax lawyers as hired 
guns who help the wealthy find loopholes). 
 66. See Richard F. Mallen & Assocs., Ltd. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74, 
76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that a personal injury law firm had standing to sue a business 
allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law “[b]ecause the practice of law by an 
entity not licensed constitutes an infringement upon the rights of those who are properly 
licensed”). 
 67. See Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215, 216 (1992) 
(tracing the principle that “[h]igh wages in a profession are necessary to compensate an 
entrant when great expenses must be incurred from learning its trade” back to Adam Smith). 
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undercurrent—perhaps even more so today with large numbers of lawyers 
unemployed.68 
The legal profession has faced accusations of economic protectionism 
since it focused on curbing the unauthorized practice of law following the 
Great Depression, but it has always denied this motive.  For example, a 
1931 American Bar Association (ABA) committee wrote:  “The practice of 
law by unauthorized persons is an evil because it endangers the personal 
and property rights of the public and interferes with the proper 
administration of justice.  It is not an evil because it takes away business 
from lawyers.”69  The same theme still comes up today.  The Washington 
Supreme Court recently adopted a rule to create limited license legal 
technicians (LLLTs) to focus on providing legal assistance in the area of 
family law.70  The Washington State Bar Association’s Board of Governors 
objected to the proposed rule and argued, among other points, that “the 
legal technician program will take work away from young, rural, and less 
affluent lawyers.”71  The Washington Supreme Court rejected this as a 
reason not to adopt the proposed rule and wrote: 
[T]he basis of any regulatory scheme, including our exercise of the 
exclusive authority to determine who can practice law in this state and 
under what circumstances, must start and end with the public interest; and 
any regulatory scheme must be designed to ensure that those who provide 
legal and law related services have the education, knowledge, skills and 
abilities to do so.  Protecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any 
practice area is not a legitimate objective.72 
Following the conclusion of the Washington Supreme Court and others,73 
this Article assumes that economic protectionism is not a proper 
justification for the monopoly. 
 
 
 68. See Reich, supra note 15, at 5 (“The murky origins of consumer protection are thus 
intimately bound up with protection of certain businesses from competition.”). 
 69. Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 56 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 477 (1931); see also Rhode, supra note 6, at 220. 
 70. Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice 
Rule:  A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75 (2013). 
 71. Id. at 106. 
 72. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, slip op. at 7 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
 73. See, e.g., State v. Pledger, 127 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1962) (stating that 
unauthorized practice of law statutes were “not enacted for the purpose of conferring upon 
the legal profession an absolute monopoly in the preparation of legal documents; its purpose 
is for the better security of the people against incompetency and dishonesty in an area of 
activity affecting general welfare”). 
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II.  THE MONOPOLY’S RESTRICTIONS ON MARKET OPTIONS AND THE 
RELATED IMPACT ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Having looked at some of the benefits of giving lawyers a monopoly over 
certain work, this Part examines some of the costs.  If the legal profession 
were not a government-regulated monopoly, it would be subject to the full 
force of state and federal consumer protection and antitrust laws.74  Instead, 
the profession has been largely policing itself with respect to traditional 
consumer protection issues—i.e., protecting consumers from deceptive 
practices, unfair billing, and the like.75  The profession has not, 
understandably, concerned itself with issues that would fall in the antitrust 
area of what can be considered “external market failures”—meaning 
anticompetitive limits on the menu of options.76  A monopoly, by its very 
definition, is obviously limiting the market.  But do the concerns about 
consumers’ limited ability to evaluate the quality of professional services 
justify abandoning concerns about the menu of options available?  To 
answer this question, this Part briefly looks at how the monopoly’s effect on 
the external market—the menu of options—negatively impacts consumers, 
focusing on the interrelated issues of cost, access, and innovation. 
A.  The Limits on Competition Drive Up Costs 
Any monopoly can drive up prices—this is one of the main rationales for 
antitrust laws.77  Scholars previously have argued that the legal profession’s 
monopoly also increases the cost of legal services to consumers.  For 
example, Professor Hadfield wrote:  “The concept of a profession may set 
the practice apart as a normative ideal, but the structuring of the [legal] 
profession is still the structuring of a market.”78  She argues that the current 
structure has resulted in a bidding competition for scarce resources that has 
been dominated by those with the most money—corporations and wealthy 
individuals.79  This, in turn, has driven up the cost of legal services because 
 
 74. This is not to suggest that the profession is completely immune to antitrust laws.  It 
is not. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (“[C]ertain 
anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act.”); Rhode, supra 
note 6, at 217–18. 
 75. See, e.g., Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 107 (Ill. 1998) (holding that the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud Act was not intended to “regulate the conduct of attorneys in representing 
clients” and, therefore, allegedly fraudulent billing practices were exempt from the Act). 
 76. Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 50–51 (describing external market failures). 
 77. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) 
(“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce 
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”). 
 78. Hadfield, supra note 53, at 956. 
 79. Id.  Professor Hadfield further explained: 
The distribution of legal services produced by the market for lawyers is thus quite 
disturbing:  organized as a self-regulating profession with guardianship of the 
public justice system, a system that lies at the heart of democratic social structure, 
the profession is propelled by market forces to devote itself disproportionately to 
the management of the economic relationships of commerce and not the 
management of just relations among individuals and the state. 
Id. at 956–57. 
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the cost is not based on the services provided; instead, it is based on the 
value that the wealthiest consumers place on the services.80 
The monopoly’s restriction on the involvement of nonlawyers also 
shields lawyers from price competition from other players in the market, 
which can also drive up costs.  For example, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has frequently cautioned bar associations not to restrict nonlawyers 
from handling real estate closings because everyone—even consumers who 
choose to hire a lawyer—pay less when nonlawyers are also allowed to 
handle real estate closings.  The FTC provided some empirical evidence for 
this position when it wrote to the Ethics Committee of the North Carolina 
State Bar: 
In 1995, after a 16-day evidentiary hearing conducted by a special master, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected an opinion eliminating lay 
closings.  The Court found that real estate closing fees were much lower 
in southern New Jersey, where lay settlements were commonplace, than in 
the northern part of the state, where lawyers conducted almost all 
settlements.  This was true even for consumers who chose attorney 
closings.  South Jersey buyers represented by counsel throughout the 
entire transaction, including closing, paid $650 on average, while sellers 
paid $350.  North Jersey buyers represented by counsel paid an average of 
$1,000, and sellers paid an average of $750.81 
Some argue that a monopoly’s high fees are just one side of a social 
contract that is of mutual benefit to both the profession and consumers.  As 
one author wrote about the history of the growth of occupational licensing 
statutes: 
Although intended to protect from competition certain industries and 
occupations—interests which were able to mobilize political support for 
entry restrictions far more easily than consumers could have mobilized 
against them—the advantages that accrued to consumers from these 
measures support a theory of mutual benefit.  Consumers in effect 
accepted higher prices in exchange for security against marginal 
operators, who might otherwise have taken advantage of rapid changes to 
defraud or endanger them.82 
There may be some truth to this mutual benefit theory.  As compared to 
other restrictions on choice, such as dietary restrictions, the public has not 
been as hostile to restrictions on choice that derive from professional 
licensing.83  This suggests that the public sees some value in licensing.  The 
 
 80. Id. at 956. 
 81. Letter from Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n to N.C. State Bar Ethics 
Comm. (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V020006.shtm (emphasis 
added); see also Letter from the Staff of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Office of Policy Planning, 
Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Econ. to Carl E. Testo, Counsel for the Rules Comm. 
of the Superior Court of Conn. (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
V070006.pdf (expressing concerns that a proposed rule to define the practice of law would 
be interpreted in an overly broad manner and would have a negative impact on consumers 
and competition). 
 82. Reich, supra note 15, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 83. See Wiley et al., supra note 36, at 89. 
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public’s discontent with lawyers is, however, mainly focused on cost.84  
Given the high cost of lawyers, this mutual benefit theory has broken down 
for the vast majority who simply cannot afford to pay the current cost of 
security against marginal operators.85 
B.  The Limits on Competition Restrict Access to Legal Services 
With few exceptions, the current scope of the legal profession’s 
monopoly limits consumers’ options for legal services to those provided by 
licensed attorneys.86  As discussed, this is justified on the basis that the 
government must regulate options for consumers who cannot assess the 
risks and benefits of services in an unregulated market.  This premise, 
however, presupposes that every consumer has the resources to hire a 
lawyer or will otherwise be able to obtain a lawyer.  If the consumer does 
not have such access—and many of them do not—then there really is no 
choice other than to proceed pro se.  Consumer protection is not advanced 
when there is a group of highly trained lawyers that large segments of the 
population cannot access.87  Under this scenario, much of the public is left 
wandering around the self-help section of bookstores and self-help kiosks in 
courthouses trying to figure out how to handle matters on their own.88  If 
they cannot become informed enough to decide to hire a paralegal versus an 
attorney, how are they supposed to become informed enough to handle 
legal matters on their own? 
The legal profession has recognized this problem, but it has almost 
exclusively focused on increasing pro bono and legal aid services as the 
remedy for this failure in access.89  In other words, the legal profession has 
historically focused on increasing access to lawyers, as opposed to 
exploring innovative alternatives, as the main solution.90  This approach is 
 
 84. See, e.g., Paul F. Teich, Are Lawyers Truly Greedy?  An Analysis of Relevant 
Empirical Evidence, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 837, 847–48 (2013) (summarizing polls 
regarding the public’s perception of lawyers’ greed and the cost of legal services). 
 85. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1–2 (“[T]he vast majority of people who 
appear without representation do so because they are unable to afford an attorney.”). 
 86. See Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession:  A Debate in Need of a 
Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79, 114–22 (2012) (discussing limited exceptions for 
form preparation assistance and representation in administrative proceedings). 
 87. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 25 (reporting data collected throughout the 
states in 2006, which found that a large percentage of litigants are unrepresented). 
 88. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 12 
(2012), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_
FINAL.pdf (noting that in 2011, over 65,000 people in Chicago, “all of whom who were 
already in court and in desperate need of assistance,” used various help desks located within 
Cook County). 
 89. Id. at 18 (“Pro bono lawyers are a great potential resource for reducing demand for 
legal services.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 413, 425 (2003) (“During the mid-twentieth century, the bar sought to encourage 
greater pro bono involvement.  Part of the motivation was to prevent the government from 
responding to pervasive unmet needs by loosening the rules against practice by 
nonlawyers . . . .”). 
 90. See, e.g., Susan Hayes Stephan, Blowing the Whistle on Justice As Sport:  100 Years 
of Playing a Non-zero Sum Game, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 613–14 (2007). 
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not working.  Study after study has concluded that every year millions of 
Americans are handling their legal matters without any legal assistance, and 
the problem is getting worse.91 
Despite the growing unmet need for legal assistance, many law school 
graduates are having trouble finding work, causing many to conclude that 
there are too many lawyers.92  There are, however, only too many lawyers 
if the demand is defined as those who can afford to pay lawyers’ going 
rates.  There are not too many lawyers if demand is defined as those who 
need legal assistance.93  The monopoly’s cost structure has created a great 
disconnect in the market between supply and demand that is preventing the 
public from accessing legal services. 
C.  The Limits on Competition Stifle Innovation 
An industry that enjoys a monopoly has little incentive to innovate in 
ways that could reduce the cost of services.94  As a self-regulated 
monopoly, the legal profession has had little incentive to innovate thus far.  
For almost the past 100 years, the education and licensing of lawyers and 
the delivery of legal services has looked about the same—lawyers attend 
three years of law school, they take a bar exam, they receive their license 
from a state supreme court, and they are the only ones authorized to provide 
legal services.  This is not necessarily surprising.  As Professor Christensen 
has written, disruptive innovations frequently originate outside of 
incumbent organizations.95 
What is unique about the legal profession, as compared to other 
professions, is that it enjoys substantial immunity from outsiders who want 
to challenge the monopoly’s status quo because, under the separation of 
powers doctrine, the state judicial branches regulate the practice of law.96  
Unlike other professions, such as the medical profession, there is no 
legislative process for outsiders to lobby and seek changes to the scope of 
the legal profession’s monopoly to allow for innovation.97  With rare 
exception, legislatures cannot authorize nonlawyers to engage in acts that 
are considered the practice of law, so any changes to the scope of the legal 
profession’s monopoly must come from the state supreme courts and their 
rulemaking processes or from challenges in the marketplace.98  Both of 
 
 91. See e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 92. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Barely Half of All 2012 Law Grads Have Long-Term, Full-
Time Legal Jobs, Data Shows, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/barely_half_of_all_2012_law_grads_have_long-term_full_time_legal_jobs_data_/. 
 93. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1 (“[O]nly a small fraction of the legal 
problems experienced by low-income people (less than one in five) are addressed with the 
assistance of either a private attorney (pro bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer.”). 
 94. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 46–47. 
 95. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA:  THE REVOLUTIONARY 
BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS (First Harper Bus. Paperback ed. 
2011); see also Campbell, supra note 10, at 7–12. 
 96. See Rigertas, supra note 86, at 111. 
 97. See id. at 111–13. 
 98. See id. at 111–26. 
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these are occurring, but most changes are occurring by challenges in the 
marketplace.99  Challenges from the marketplace, however, can be risky 
business propositions in the absence of clear authorization from the state 
supreme courts.  If a new business model is challenging the status quo, it 
may face a lawsuit charging the unauthorized practice of law.  The survival 
of the business—and value of the investment in it—could then turn on the 
outcome of that lawsuit.  Challenges from the marketplace also put the state 
supreme courts in the position of leading from behind instead of being in 
the forefront of thinking about ways to increase access. 
III.  REASSESSING THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY 
The future sustainability of the legal profession’s monopoly will require 
state supreme courts to be more proactive in assessing ways to increase 
access and to reexamine the boundaries of lawyers’ exclusive practice 
areas.  As an initial matter, it may be helpful for them to set out an explicit 
analytical framework to assess the type of services that lawyers provide in 
light of the types of justifications for limiting consumer options.  It may be 
helpful as an initial matter to conceptualize the framework as a table to 
examine areas where alternative approaches may be viable.  Here is a 














This Article argues that the justifications for the monopoly are the 
strongest in the first column and then, as a whole, get progressively weaker 
as indicated by the color shading.100  Therefore, the strength of the 
justifications for limiting legal service providers to only licensed attorneys 
does not have the same force across the entire spectrum of work that 
lawyers do.  And, in fact, what is pragmatically happening across the 
country in terms of nonlawyer activity also supports this conclusion.101  The 
 
 99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 100. These rationales for government regulation can be expanded into a more nuanced 
list, but this Article is focusing on these two key areas.  For a more detailed list of possible 
regulatory objectives, see Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734–42. 
 101. See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 10, at 3001; Barton, supra note 13, at 3084–85. 
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remainder of this Part briefly looks at the two ends of the spectrum on this 
table to explore how this framework can help inform future regulations. 
Based on this preliminary table, the strictest limits on who can practice 
law have the strongest justifications when the work involves the courts, as 
reflected in the first column.  In that column, there are valid consumer 
protection concerns and valid concerns about the integrity and functioning 
of the judicial branch, so there is a strong case to be made for some 
regulation of legal services.  The relative strength of the justification does 
not necessarily mean that only lawyers should perform those services.  
Under the current structure, the lack of access to legal assistance by those 
who can afford such services undermines the consumer protection concerns.  
Therefore, more state supreme courts should consider alternative types of 
regulation.  Much like the delivery of healthcare services, there are potential 
benefits in stratifying the legal profession to train and regulate professionals 
with different types of legal training.102 
Three states—Washington, California, and New York—are all currently 
examining the role that nonlawyers can play in the delivery of legal 
services.  This suggests some growing recognition that a licensed attorney 
may not be needed for every legal issue.103  In June 2012, the Washington 
Supreme Court enacted the most expansive model to date—a Limited 
Practice Rule for LLLTs.104  The rule creates a framework for the licensing 
and regulation of nonlawyers, who will be authorized to independently 
perform discrete tasks that clearly are the practice of law.105  The 
Washington Supreme Court explained that the rule was necessary because 
the legal profession’s efforts to close the access to justice gap have not 
successfully stopped the growth of low- and moderate-income citizens who 
have no access to affordable legal assistance.106  In March 2013, the 
Washington Supreme Court approved family law as the first practice 
area.107  One of the benefits of this approach is that the LLLTs owe 
 
 102. See Rigertas, supra note 86, at 118–22. 
 103. Consistent with this idea, several states and federal agencies have authorized 
nonlawyers to appear in a representative capacity in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., 5 
U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (permitting federal agencies to determine whether nonlawyers may 
appear in administrative proceedings in a representative capacity); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
405/806 (2014) (authorizing nonlawyers to represent claimants before the Illinois 
Department of Employment Security); 26 C.F.R. § 601.502 (2014) (permitting certain 
nonlawyers to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service); 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 511.71–.73 (2013) (permitting nonlawyers to represent parties before the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration). 
 104. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28.  For an in-depth analysis of this rule and the 
history of its enactment, see generally Holland, supra note 70. 
 105. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-1-1005, slip op. at 2 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf. 
 106. Id. at 4–6. 
 107. Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT), WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-Technicians/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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professional duties to their clients similar to those of an attorney, which 
includes important protections such as the attorney-client privilege.108 
California and New York are in earlier stages of exploring the role of 
nonlawyers.  In March 2013, the State Bar of California’s Board of Trustees 
created a Limited License Working Group to explore the creation of a 
limited practice license.109  The working group has had several public 
meetings and has recommended further study of a limited license program 
as a way to increase access to legal services.110  In New York, Chief Judge 
Jonathan Lippman formed the Committee on Non-Lawyers and the Justice 
Gap in early 2013 to study the use of nonlawyers to provide some 
assistance in simple legal matters.  That committee was expected to make 
recommendations for a pilot program to focus in the areas of housing, elder 
law, and consumer credit before the end of 2013.111  All of this suggests a 
growing recognition that more options can be made available to consumers 
without creating intolerable risk.  It is possible, however, that none of these 
options go far enough.  The tasks authorized so far are really quite 
constrained and they may just be the first step necessary to develop 
expanded options.  State supreme courts should robustly explore these 
options. 
Returning to the table, as one moves to the fourth column, consumer 
protection concerns still exist, but the concern about the integrity and 
functioning of the judicial branch decreases.  Therefore, the state supreme 
courts should consider alternative regulations, or perhaps even deregulation 
of some services in these areas.  Deregulation of some legal services would 
reduce the costs of services through increased options and competition, but 
it would increase the risk to consumers of incompetent services.  
Consumers would have little assurance of the quality of services they were 
purchasing other than those assurances provided by the marketplace.  
Instead of protecting consumers at the point of purchase, consumer 
protection would largely depend on postinjury remedies that would likely 
arise from lawsuits for breach of contract, consumer fraud, or deceptive 
trade practices.112  These remedies could be insufficient because 
questionable operators may not have adequate assets to pay judgments.113  
Furthermore, consumers would not have any of the protections that arise 
from professional duties, such as the duty of confidentiality and the duty of 
 
 108. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(k). 
 109. For links to the Working Group’s agendas and news, see Limited License Working 
Group, ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/BoardofTrustees/LimitedLicense
WorkingGroup.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 110. Laura Ernde, Panel Gives Nod to Limited License Idea, CAL. B.J. (July 2013), 
http://www.calbarjournal.com/July2013/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx. 
 111. Joel Stashenko, Non-lawyers May Be Given Role in Closing ‘Justice Gap,’ N.Y. 
L.J., May 29, 2013, at 1. 
 112. Instead of complete deregulation, there could be limited regulation that mandated 
certain disclaimers and information to help consumers assess the risk of the services being 
purchased. 
 113. Publicly funded victim compensation funds could provide an alternative source of 
recovery if the profession was deregulated. 
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loyalty.  These concerns support a conclusion that deregulation is not as 
attractive an option as a broad remedy for increasing options.  In effect, this 
approach would completely swing the pendulum so that the consumers 
would have little protection from internal market failures in order to remedy 
external market failures.  However, deregulation may be appropriate in 
some limited areas. 
There are a growing number of examples of consumers exercising the 
limited choices available to them with little evidence of consumer harm.114  
Some of these areas are unregulated.  As mentioned, many consumers have 
paid money for do-it-yourself assistance from companies like Nolo Press 
and LegalZoom.115  Many companies hire consulting firms that may or may 
not have lawyers on staff to provide advice about a wide range of regulatory 
compliance.116  The state supreme courts should consider amending the 
formal rules that are, in many respects, inconsistent with what is actually 
occurring in the market.  Furthermore, other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, are experimenting with alternative structures to deliver legal 
services, which are providing additional data that some alternative models 
can exist without undue harm to consumers.117  This area warrants further 
exploration. 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of the suggestions for deregulation and stratification are a 
couple of assumptions.  First, there is an assumption that reducing the costs 
of entry to the profession and increasing competition will make legal 
services of an adequate quality more affordable to a broader segment of the 
population.  Second, there is an assumption that without a three-year juris 
doctor, a person could still be trained to competently handle some legal 
matters.  Both of these assumptions warrant more study, but it is likely that 
getting reliable data on these assumptions will not be possible until more 
states experiment and implement alternatives that can be assessed.  When 
the Washington Supreme Court created LLLTs, it responded to criticism 
that the economics of the proposal were unknown: 
 
 114. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1981).  
Only 39 percent of jurisdictions surveyed reported any direct customer complaints, and out 
of the 1,188 inquiries, investigations, and complaints reported by bar agencies, only 2 
percent were a form of customer complaint about a specific customer injury. Id. at 33; see 
also Thomas D. Zilavy & Andrew J. Chevrez, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:  
Court Tells Profession, Show Us the Harm, 78 WIS. LAW. 8 (2005), available at 
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No one has a crystal ball.  It may be that stand-alone limited license legal 
technicians will not find the practice lucrative and that the cost of 
establishing and maintaining a practice under this rule will require them to 
charge rates close to those of attorneys.  On the other hand, it may be that 
economies can be achieved that will allow these very limited services to 
be offered at a market rate substantially below those of attorneys.  There 
is simply no way to know the answer to this question without trying it.118 
It is also worth noting that deregulation and stratification will not fill the 
entire gap.  There is still a segment of the population that cannot afford to 
pay anything for legal services.  For that group, legal aid and pro bono will 
continue to be vital.  However, legal aid and pro bono are never going to be 
able to close the entire gap.119  For those who can pay something for legal 
services, but not the going rates, more options need to be available. 
There are several issues in legal education that make exploring the 
training of different types of professionals particularly timely.  First, there 
has been a consistent decline in law school applications over the past 
several years that has left most law schools with excess capacity.120  There 
have been predictions that some schools will close.121  Given the number of 
unmet legal needs, however, this would be an unfortunate outcome.  
Second, there has been a call from the legal profession for law schools to 
produce graduates who are “practice ready.”122  Third, there has been 
discussion and concern about the rising cost of legal education.123  Many 
who address the issue of cost suggest reducing the number of credits to 
obtain a law degree.124 
If the state supreme courts are willing to reexamine who can practice law, 
it may also be a good opportunity to examine how legal education should be 
retooled.  What if schools could offer the traditional three-year juris doctor 
program that would allow someone to practice in all areas, as is the case 
today, but also offer several specialty degrees that would only require 
twelve or eighteen months of study and lead to a limited license in that 
practice area?  For example, could a law school—working with the existing 
curriculum—craft a two- or three-semester curriculum in an area such as 
housing law that would prepare a graduate to fully represent clients in 
landlord-tenant disputes, evictions, foreclosures, and real estate closings?  
Could states go beyond what Washington State has done, which does not 
allow the LLLTs to appear in court, and let law schools create a two- or 
 
 118. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-1-1005, slip op. at 8–9 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf. 
 119. Rigertas, supra note 86, at 90–94. 
 120. Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall As Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students:  Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 2011, at A1. 
 123. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at BU1. 
 124. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Samuel Estreicher, Make Law Schools Earn a Third Year, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, at A27. 
2014] FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 2703 
three-semester curriculum that would lead to a limited license in family law 
that would allow a practitioner to fully represent clients in divorce and 
custody proceedings?  If these subject-specific licenses included a semester 
of field practice or apprenticeship prior to being licensed, would these 
practitioners be closer to being practice ready?  In a world of increasingly 
specialized practice, does everyone who is authorized to practice law need a 
general legal education?  If the external market—the menu of options 
available—is an important aspect of consumer protection, then the state 
supreme courts should explore all of these questions. 
